What is the issue and why does it matter? Ethiopia has long been a major player in Somalia’s stabilization and counterinsurgency efforts. For over a decade, Ethiopian forces have been instrumental in countering al-Shabaab insurgents and stabilizing key regions, particularly in Hir-Shabelle, South West State, and Jubaland. Their presence has acted as a critical deterrent to al-Shabaab’s activities while bolstering fragile government control. However, a contentious Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland strained relations with Somalia’s federal government, undermining Ethiopia’s role in the critical transition to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) and raising fears of potential security vacuums.

With tensions high and the year-end withdrawal deadline looming, a last-minute mediation led by Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan brought Ethiopia and Somalia’s leaders to Ankara, producing a significant breakthrough. The Ankara talks succeeded in easing tensions, culminating in the resumption of full diplomatic relations between the two nations. This détente has made Ethiopia’s inclusion in AUSSOM almost certain, alleviating immediate concerns over a wholesale withdrawal. However, significant uncertainties persist: Ethiopia’s maritime and naval ambitions remain a contentious issue, with technical negotiations on access to the sea scheduled in the coming months. At the same time, Somalia’s federal government, engaged in ongoing tensions with its Federal Member States (FMS), remains cautious about Ethiopia’s extensive military footprint and its close ties with FMS administrations. As the AUSSOM transition unfolds, the scope of Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia will likely be influenced by a mix of strategic imperatives and political calculations. Localized withdrawals in certain districts remain a possibility as the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) seeks to balance security priorities with the political sensitivities tied to Ethiopia’s long-standing influence.

This study, through a unique integration of field research and advanced machine learning methodologies, examines the risks associated with such potential withdrawals during the fraught transition to AUSSOM. It provides a granular analysis of district-level vulnerabilities, emphasizing how the departure of Ethiopian forces could exacerbate insecurity in areas already grappling with entrenched al-Shabaab influence and fragile governance structures. Specifically, it models risk levels for 14 districts across Gedo, South West State’s Bay and Bakool regions, and Hiiraan, where Ethiopian forces are currently deployed.

What are our findings? Model-based analysis reveals that the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces would leave critical districts in South West State and Jubaland at near-total risk of militant control. In South West State, districts such as Hudur, Waajid, Diinsoor, Buur Hakaba, and Qansax Dheere, already highly vulnerable despite ENDF presence, are likely to fall swiftly to militants, isolating Baidoa and destabilizing the broader region. In Jubaland’s Gedo region, ENDF functions as a critical containment force; without their presence, districts like Baardheere and Luuq face a projected risk of militant control surging to 98%. This scenario would expose strategic centers such as Garbahaarey, Gedo’s regional capital, to encirclement and heightened instability. Hiiraan, in contrast, demonstrates greater resilience due to the active role of local clan militias such as the Macawisleys, yet its capacity for sustained defense remains uncertain without external support. Proposed alternatives, such as deploying Egyptian forces, lack the localized intelligence and operational expertise required to replicate ENDF’s stabilizing role. These vulnerabilities are further compounded by AUSSOM’s reduced troop numbers and limited operational scope. Escalating tensions between the federal government and Federal Member States (FMS) further undermine counterinsurgency coordination and create exploitable governance gaps for al-Shabaab.

What should be done? Addressing these challenges requires a recalibration of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, centered on fostering mutual respect for each other's sovereignty. Ethiopia must clarify its maritime ambitions and ensure they align with Somalia’s sovereignty to avert further crises. If the technical negotiations falter, a phased withdrawal of Ethiopian forces should ensure their extended presence in high-risk districts to mitigate immediate security vacuums. Additionally, integrating Ethiopian and Egyptian forces under AUSSOM requires clear geographic delineation to minimize friction and maximize operational effectiveness. Simultaneously, Somalia must focus on strengthening its security forces, repairing relations with FMS, and aligning deployments with counterinsurgency priorities to ensure a sustainable and coordinated security transition.